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III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-3-102(3)(j).  The case was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-103(2)(j). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
A. Did the trial court err in concluding that the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation (“Tribe”) is a necessary and indispensable party as to causes of 
action which are state law claims brought against Tribal officials for ultra vires acts as 
well as other parties who are not affiliated with the Tribe, which occurred outside of Ute 
Tribal land and within the State of Utah?  
The standard for review is an abuse of discretion standard.  See Seftel v. Capital 
City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).  Although not necessary to preserve 
this issue, this issue was preserved in the trial court.  R.  198-200, 203-217, 259-272. 
B. Did the trial court err in not concluding that the state’s interests in
promoting fair and competitive business activity free from unlawful interference from 
foreign powers, by protecting non-Indian state residents, who compose roughly 95% of 
the area population, state small businesses, and the oil and gas industry, which is the  
lifeblood of the local economy, outweigh the interests of the Tribe in regulating non-
Indian business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land, the 
jurisdiction of the Tribe, and within the jurisdiction of the State of Utah?   
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 This is a jurisdictional issue and the standard for review is under a correction of 
error standard. The trial court’s ruling is given no deference.  Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT 
App 199, ¶7, 29 P.3d 13.  This issue was preserved in the trial court.  R. 1483-1499.   
 C.     Did the trial court err in granting the Utah R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss filed by various defendants? 
 The standard for review is under a correction of error standard. The trial court’s 
ruling is given no deference.  See St. Benedict’s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 
P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) (cited authorities omitted).   
 As it relates to the tort of extortion, the trial court found as a matter of law that the 
State of Utah does not recognize this cause of action.  This issue of first impression 
presents a question of law and the trial court is given no deference.  Id.  These issues 
were preserved in the trial court.  R.  664-685, 689-703. 
 D. Did the trial court err in concluding that the tribal officials are immune 
from suit, where the conduct complained of violates state law, occurred outside of Ute 
Tribal land within the State of Utah, and outside the jurisdiction of the Tribe?   
 This is a jurisdictional issue and the standard for review is under a correction of 
error standard. The trial court’s ruling is given no deference.  Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT 
App 199, ¶7.  This issue was preserved in the trial court.  R. 1151-1179.   
 E.     Did the trial court err in finding that the Tribe did not waive sovereign 
immunity, by making a general appearance in state court and seeking affirmative relief 
from the state court beyond a dismissal on the grounds of jurisdiction? 
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The standard for review is under a correction of error standard and the trial court’s 
ruling is given no deference.  State v. Reber, 2007 UT 36, ¶8, 171 P.3d 406.  This issue 
was preserved in the trial court.  R. 1458-1465   
F. Did the trial court err by not allowing supplemental pleadings, where 
Plaintiffs/Appellants sought leave to plead supplemental facts which did not occur until 
well after the complaint was drafted and during periods the action was stayed in state 
court? 
A Utah R. of Civ. P. 15(d) motion is “addressed to the sound discretion of the 
court, and leave to serve a supplemental pleading ‘should be liberally granted unless good 
reason exists for denying leave.’” Sw. Nurseries, LLC v. Florists Mut. Ins., Inc., 266 F. 
Supp. 2d 1253, 1256, (D. Colo. 2003) (quoted authority omitted).  “Refusing leave to 
amend is generally only justified upon a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the 
opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed, or futility of amendment.”  Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 
1365 (10th Cir. 1993).  This issue was preserved in the trial court.  R. 1469-1482.   
V. STATEMENT OF STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
1. Utah R. of Civ. P. 19:
Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
See Aplt. Addendum Page 2 
2. UTAH CONST. art. XII § 19 [Blacklisting forbidden]
Each person in Utah is free to obtain and enjoy employment 
whenever possible, and a person or corporation, or their agent, 
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servant, or employee may not maliciously interfere with any person 
from obtaining employment or enjoying employment already 
obtained from any other person or corporation. 
 
3. UTAH CONST. art. XVI § 4 [Exchange of blacklists prohibited] 
 
The exchange of black lists by railroad companies, or other 
corporations, associations or persons is prohibited.  
 
VI.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 Plaintiffs filed suit in the trial court asserting several state law claims, including 
tortious interference with economic relations, extortion, unlawful restraint of trade, 
blacklisting and civil conspiracy against Defendants Cesspooch, LaRose and Wopsock, 
as well as other defendants, who were added in the amended complaint, including 
Newfield Exploration Company, Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC, 
L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc. Scamp Excavation, Inc., Huffman Enterprises, Inc., 
LaRose Construction Company, Inc., and D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C.  Plaintiffs’ relief 
requested included a request for declaratory judgment that “the assertion of Tribal 
jurisdiction as a defense to Plaintiffs’ claims is unavailing, as the Tribe lacks jurisdiction” 
over certain land categories set forth in the pleading.   
 On September 20, 2013, the Tribe removed the case to federal court.  Following 
the filing of the removal notice, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting remand to the state 
court. On July 1, 2014, the Federal District Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion (the 
“Remand Order”).  The Tribe appealed the Remand Order to the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  By opinion entered August 13, 2015, the Remand Order was upheld.  The trial 
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court granted motions to dismiss filed by various Defendants resulting in the dismissal of 
all of Plaintiffs’ claims on May 12, 2016.    
A.   FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 1. Procedural Facts 
 The Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Original 
Complaint”) was filed by Plaintiffs in this matter on April 5, 2013. R. 1-21.  The Original 
Complaint identified four Defendants (collectively referred to as the “Initial 
Defendants”), the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (the “Tribe”), 
Dino Cesspooch, individually and as a Ute Tribal Employment Rights Office (“UTERO”) 
Commissioner, Jackie LaRose, individually and as a UTERO Commissioner, and Sheila 
Wopsock, individually and as the UTERO Director. R. 1-21.   
 The complaint sought declaratory judgment with respect to the Tribe’s and tribal 
official’s exercise of authority over non-Indians in certain categories of land.  R. 1-21. 
The complaint then alleged two state law causes of action, tortious interference with 
economic relations and extortion, against the tribal officials for their ultra vires actions 
which damaged Plaintiffs. R. 1-21.  
 On May 1, 2013, J. Preston Stieff filed an Entry of Special Appearance and a 
motion to dismiss the complaint on behalf of the Initial Defendants. R. 198-200, 203-217.  
The Initial Defendants asserted four basic arguments to support dismissal, including that 
the court lacked jurisdiction due to insufficient process and insufficient service of 
process, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of a valid waiver of 
sovereign immunity, the court lacked jurisdiction over necessary and indispensable 
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parties, and the court lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies. R. 203-217.    
 The Initial Defendants requested that the state court interpret and make 
conclusions of law related to the issue of sovereign immunity. R. 203-217.  This included 
requests that the state court analyze and interpret the waiver provisions of the UTERO 
Ordinance, and the Law and Order Code of the Ute Indian Tribe. R. 203-217. Affidavits 
were presented to the state court and it was requested that the state court dismiss the case 
based on the “facts and legal authorities” cited in the memorandum supporting the motion 
to dismiss. R. 218-220, 203-217. 
 The Initial Defendants also filed two motions requesting pro hac vice admission 
for two attorneys for the Tribe. R. 398-400, 405-407 and those motions were granted by 
respective orders on June 11, 2013. R. 419-422.  On July 8, 2013, Patrick Boice filed his 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel, for Defendants Cesspooch, LaRose and Wopsock. R. 
427-428. 
 Plaintiffs filed their motion requesting leave to amend the complaint on July 17, 
2013. R. 431-435. The amended complaint (“Amended Complaint”) seeks a declaration 
that “the assertion of Tribal jurisdiction as a defense to Plaintiffs’ claims is unavailing, as 
the Tribe lacks jurisdiction” over certain land categories set forth in the amended 
complaint, and then asserts several state law claims, including tortious interference with 
economic relations, extortion, unlawful restraint of trade, blacklisting and civil 
conspiracy against Defendants Cesspooch, LaRose and Wopsock, as well as other 
Defendants, who were added in the Amended Complaint, including Newfield Exploration 
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Company, Newfield Rocky Mountains, Inc., Newfield RMI, LLC, L.C. Welding & 
Construction, Inc., Scamp Excavation, Inc., Huffman Enterprises, Inc., LaRose 
Construction Company, Inc. and D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. R. 548-579.  
 Not all Defendants are implicated in each cause of action and no causes of action 
are asserted against the Tribe other than defensive declaratory relief nor are any damages 
sought from the Tribe pursuant to the Amended Complaint. R. 548-579. The sole relief 
sought respecting the Tribe is defensive declaratory relief that assertion of Tribal 
jurisdiction in certain land categories outside the jurisdiction of the Tribe does not defeat 
Plaintiffs’ state law claims against the other parties. R. 548-579.  
 On July 22, 2013, the state court held the hearing on the Initial Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss. The parties argued every element of the motion, including issues as to 
service, sovereign immunity, indispensable parties and exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. R. 198-200, 203-217.  In terms of service, the Tribe argued, among other 
things, that service of process on the Tribe would need to be completed through the Ute 
Tribal Court, that all six (6) members of the Business Committee (the governing body of 
the Tribe) must be served, that the summons and complaint must be domesticated by the 
Ute Tribal Court and that the Ute Tribal Court must be petitioned to authorize service. R. 
371-379.   
 The state court rendered a partial decision rejecting the Tribe’s argument as to 
service requirements on the Tribe, by allowing service by mail on the Tribe and 
Defendant Wopsock. R. 508-507. Defendants Cesspooch and LaRose had already been 
personally served in May 2013. 
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 The court also afforded all parties the opportunity to brief the issue of whether the 
Initial Defendants had made a general appearance rather than a special appearance by 
including items other than service issues in their motion to dismiss. The parties were 
allowed until August 2, 2013 to brief the issue. R. 508-511. Plaintiffs, the Tribe, and 
Defendants Cesspooch, LaRose and Wopsock subsequently briefed the issue and it was 
pending before the trial court at the time of the removal to federal court. R. 484-490, 493-
495, 498-499. At the July hearing, the trial court then took the remaining issues under 
advisement.  
 The Initial Defendants did not oppose the motion to amend the complaint, and, on 
August 16, 2013, the state court entered its order permitting the amending of the 
complaint. R. 519-520. The Amended Complaint was served on Defendants, and returns 
were filed with the state court. R. 526-530, 533-536, 537-544, 582-603, 607-618, 622-
625.   
 The Tribe filed a notice of removal on September 20, 2013. R. 629-636. Plaintiffs 
then filed a motion requesting remand to the state court. In granting remand, the federal 
court observed that “th[e] defendants . . . submitted and argued a nearly identical motion 
to dismiss in th[at] [c]ourt as the motion originally filed and argued before the state 
court.” R. 648-655. The court further opined, “Thus, it seems defendants held nothing 
back in an effort to dispose of the matter in the first instance before the state court.” R. 
648-655. 
 Defendants appealed the Remand Order to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Defendants also filed a motion in the state court to stay the action. On October 9, 2014, 
the action was stayed by the trial court during the pendency of the appeal of the Remand 
Order. R. 738-742, 895-900. By opinion entered August 13, 2015, the Remand Order was 
upheld. R. 1031-1047. The trial court granted motions to dismiss filed by various 
defendants resulting in the dismissal of all of Plaintiffs’ claims on March 28, 2016. R. 
1757-1794.   
2. Facts Pleaded in Amended Complaint
The Amended Complaint consists of 33 pages. The following is a summary of the 
facts alleged and assumed true for purposes of the Utah R. of Civ. P. 12 motions granted 
by the district court and relevant to the issues on appeal. 
Plaintiffs are persons and corporations domiciled in and doing business in 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties. R. 549-550. Plaintiffs provide dirt, sand, and gravel 
products, and lease heavy equipment (the “Products”). R. 553-554. Plaintiffs’ business 
activities do not require them to access or even pass through Ute Tribal land, with 
operations confined to fee land outside of Ute Tribal land as defined under Hagen v. 
Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994).  R. 553-554.   
The Tribe is a federally recognized tribe with reservation lands located in 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties. Defendant Dino Cesspooch (“Commissioner Cesspooch” 
or “Cesspooch”) is an appointed UTERO Commissioner, and is sued in his individual as 
well as his official capacity. R. 550. Defendant Jackie LaRose (“Commissioner LaRose” 
or “LaRose”) is an appointed UTERO Commissioner, and is sued in his individual as 
well as his official capacity. R. 550. Defendant Sheila Wopsock (“Director Wopsock” or 
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“Wopsock”) is the appointed Director of the UTERO Commission, and is sued in her 
individual as well as her official capacity. R. 550.   
 Defendants, Newfield Production Company and Newfield Rocky Mountain, Inc. 
are Delaware corporations, Defendant Newfield RMI, LLC is a Delaware limited liability 
company, and Defendant Newfield Drilling Services Inc. is a Utah corporation, and all of 
these entities (referred to collectively herein as “Newfield”) are under common 
ownership and control, and are engaged in the exploration, development and production 
of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids with production regions, employees, 
operations, and doing business in Duchesne and Uintah Counties. R. 550-551.    
 Defendant L.C. Welding & Construction, Inc. (“L.C. Welding”) is a Utah 
corporation. R. 551. Defendant Scamp Excavation, Inc. (“Scamp”) is a Utah corporation. 
R. 551. Defendant Huffman Enterprises, Inc. (“Huffman”) is a Utah corporation. R. 551. 
Defendant LaRose Construction Company, Inc. (“LaRose Construction”) is a Utah 
corporation. R. 551. Defendant D.Ray C. Enterprises, L.L.C. (“D.Ray Enterprises”) is a 
Utah limited liability company. R. 552. All of these entities, like Newfield do business in 
Utah and are subject to jurisdiction in Utah. R. 550-552.   
 Duchesne and Uintah Counties are located in Utah’s Uintah Basin. R. 552. The 
major economic force of the Uintah Basin is the oil and gas industry. R. 552. A majority 
of the revenue earned by Plaintiffs is generated by providing the Products to oil and gas 
companies. R. 553.       
 There are approximately 54,000 residents of Uintah and Duchesne Counties. R. 
552. The Uintah and Ouray Reservation of the Ute Indian Tribe is located within the 
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Uintah Basin. R. 552. There are approximately 3,000 enrolled members of the Tribe. R. 
553.  
 Since in or about September 2012, Cesspooch has harassed, threatened, bullied, 
and intimidated Plaintiffs by threatening to utilize his position as a UTERO 
Commissioner to “shut down” Plaintiffs’ businesses if UTERO certification was not 
obtained. R. 554. Cesspooch’s threats subjected Plaintiffs to duress because oil and gas 
companies, including Newfield, have “. . . cooperated with and assisted Cesspooch by 
refusing work and to do business with companies similar to Plaintiffs’. . .” effectively 
putting these companies out of business. R. 554. 
 Plaintiffs explained that their business operations were confined to private fee land 
and that they do not access or even travel through Ute Tribal land in their business 
operations. R. 554-555. Despite this, Cesspooch persisted in and escalated his threats, 
including threats to impound Plaintiffs’ heavy equipment that was located on private fee 
land, not within Ute Tribal land. R. 555. Under duress and in an effort to save their 
businesses, Plaintiffs obtained UTERO Certification in or about November 2012. R. 555-
556. 
 Even after UTERO Certification was obtained, Cesspooch persisted in his threats. 
R. 556. Plaintiffs were accosted by Cesspooch at the China Star Restaurant located in 
Roosevelt, Utah. R. 556. Cesspooch claimed his signature on certification documents 
issued to Plaintiffs were no good and his signature had been forged. R. 556. At a later 
meeting at another restaurant in Roosevelt, Cesspooch did an about-face and informed 
Plaintiffs that their UTERO Certification was good. R. 557.      
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 In February 2013, while Plaintiffs were traveling on Highway 40 in Roosevelt, 
they were forced to pull over by Cesspooch into a local business parking lot located 
within Roosevelt. R. 557-558. Cesspooch then attempted to extort Plaintiffs. R. 557-558. 
 A short time after Plaintiffs refused Cesspooch’s extortionist demands, Director 
Wopsock sent correspondence accusing Plaintiffs of submitting false and inaccurate 
official tribal, state and federal documents. R. 558. On March 20, 2015, Wopsock 
demanded that all oil and gas companies cease doing business with Plaintiffs. R. 558. 
Wopsock’s demands were not limited to Ute Tribal lands. R. 558.   
 Newfield cooperated and complied with Wopsock’s directives and, by email dated 
March 22, 2013, informed Plaintiffs that it would no longer utilize their Products. R. 558.  
This was not limited to business conducted on Ute Tribal land, R. 558, and the situs of 
Plaintiffs’ business operations is exclusively outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 554-555. 
Newfield has also refused to do business with any third party who utilizes Plaintiffs’ 
Products. R. 559. Newfield has informed Plaintiffs that it will not do business with 
Plaintiffs or work with anyone who does business with Plaintiffs based on their 
cooperation with the UTERO officials.1 R. 559. Newfield’s cooperation with the 
unlawful and ultra vires actions of tribal officials in blacklisting and boycotting Plaintiffs 
is the direct and proximate cause of substantial damages to Plaintiffs. R. 559.  Plaintiffs 
discussed this matter with Cesspooch who was unable to provide Plaintiffs with a single 
                                                             
1 UTERO officials and tribal officials are used interchangeably throughout this brief.   
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reason why the UTERO officials terminated Plaintiffs’ businesses, and had Plaintiffs 
blacklisted and boycotted by the local oil and gas industry. R. 559.   
 Cesspooch has threatened third parties that he would “shut down” their businesses 
if they leased any equipment from Plaintiffs. R. 560. Nelson Construction, Inc. informed 
Plaintiffs that Wopsock demanded that they not utilize Plaintiffs’ rock crushing 
equipment that is located on private ground that is not on Ute Tribal land. R. 560.     
 UTERO officials have engaged in a pattern and practice of extorting money from 
area businesses by threatening to “shut down” their operations if the businesses do not 
pay the UTERO officials. R. 560. For example, Cesspooch, a convicted felon, has 
demanded 10% of area businesses’ gross revenues in return for “keep[ing] them working 
and UTERO compliant.” R. 560. UTERO officials dictate to oil and gas companies which 
contractors will be awarded bids and which contractors are not to be used. R. 561. These 
directives are not limited to work performed on Ute Tribal land, and have resulted in 
substantial harm to Plaintiffs’ enterprises outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 562.   
 LaRose, at all relevant times, owned an interest in an oil & gas service company, 
LaRose Construction. R. 561. LaRose received bribes and work from Huffman, a 
competitor of Plaintiffs, in exchange for LaRose’s abusing his position as a UTERO 
Commissioner and wrongfully diverting business from Plaintiffs to Huffman. R. 561. 
LaRose, L.C. Welding, and Scamp conspired to receive an economic interest in a sand 
and gravel pit located outside of tribal land which commenced operation after Plaintiffs 
were “shut down” by Wopsock, Cesspooch, and LaRose. R. 561. Wopsock, Cesspooch, 
and LaRose conspired to abuse their UTERO positions to destroy Plaintiffs’ businesses in 
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an effort to eliminate competition and because Plaintiffs refused to pay Cesspooch’s 
extortionist demands. R. 562. LaRose Construction and D.Ray Enterprises participated in 
the conspiracy and derived a substantial economic benefit by eliminating Plaintiffs as a 
competitor of the aforementioned sand and gravel pit. R. 571.   
 Defendants conspired together and acted with improper purpose and/or through 
improper means with said action exceeding the limits of the jurisdiction the Ute Tribe. R. 
568. This was done to promote Defendants’ own business interests resulting in injury to 
Plaintiffs. R. 568. Defendants intentionally and maliciously engaged in a conspiracy for 
the purpose of causing damage to Plaintiffs and obtained unlawful financial gain. R. 573. 
All acts and occurrences complained of in the Amended Complaint occurred on fee land 
outside of Ute Tribal land as defined under Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994). R. 562.       
 3. Supplemental Facts 
 Plaintiffs sought to supplement the facts set forth in the Amended Complaint 
pursuant to Utah R. of Civ. P. 15(d). These allegations relate to events that occurred 
during the lengthy period the matter was stayed while on appeal to the 10th Circuit, and 
are summarized below. 
 Newfield demanded on numerous occasions that no subcontractors utilize the 
Plaintiffs’ Products. R. 1476-1480. Newfield threatened that any subcontractors found 
utilizing Plaintiffs’ Products would be prohibited from doing subcontract work for 
Newfield. R. 1476. 
 Plaintiffs’ sand and gravel pits were located where the Products could be 
transported to Newfield oil and gas production locations for less than competitors, and, 
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after transferring a sand and gravel pit lease to a third party lessee, Newfield began 
purchasing products from that lessee. R. 1476-1477. UTERO officials and employees 
have continued to threaten and harass any third party seen leaving a sand and gravel pit 
operated by Plaintiffs, this harassment has taken place on county roads located non-Tribal 
land and threats include blacklisting any third party seen leaving Plaintiffs’ sand and 
gravel pits. R. 1477. The threats are made regardless of whether the Products are to be 
used by oil and gas production companies or for private projects on non-Tribal land, 
county, city or state projects, and the threats and harassment have resulted in Plaintiffs 
losing sales. R. 1477-1478. For example, C&R Crane was blacklisted by UTERO 
officials, with the aid and cooperation of oil and gas production companies such as 
Newfield, after one of C&R Crane's employees was harassed and threatened by tribal 
officials after leaving one of Plaintiffs’ pits. R. 1478. 
 Kaufusi Excavating, an excavation company, was not allowed to bid on work for 
Newfield after being blacklisted by UTERO Officials for leasing Plaintiffs’ equipment.  
In a Newfield bid walk that occurred in December of 2015, the only companies allowed 
by Newfield to bid on the project were Defendants LaRose Construction, Huffman, and 
L.C. Welding. R. 1478. Defendants have been effective in eliminating competition. R. 
1478-1479. 
 A private investigative firm commissioned by the Tribe submitted a report 
confirming that UTERO Officials, acting ultra vires, have made unlawful monetary 
demands on local small businesses, like Plaintiffs, catering to the oil and gas industry. R. 
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1479. Cesspooch and LaRose have obstructed investigations and some Defendants’ files 
have been removed from the UTERO office. R. 1479.    
On January 8, 2015, the Tribe sent UTERO demands to all employers “engaging 
in commercial or employment activity within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation” that non-Indians must first be terminated if there is any reduction in 
the employer’s workforce. R. 1480. This demand is made of companies, including 
Plaintiffs, that operate within exterior boundaries but outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 1480. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The Tribe is not a necessary or indispensable party as to lawsuits brought to
enjoin ultra vires acts of tribal officials that violate state law and occur outside of Ute 
Tribal land.  This matter involves tribal officials in extorting and blacklisting Plaintiffs, 
and engaging in other noncompetitive measures. It is not a critical interest of the Tribe to 
facilitate such acts, especially where those acts occur outside of Ute Tribal land. Indeed, 
attempting to regulate business activities which occur outside of Ute Tribal land has 
nothing to do with protecting the Tribe’s self-governance, and these activities are clearly 
within the purview of local, state, and federal bodies, not the Tribe.  
2. The State of Utah’s interest in promoting fair and competitive business
activity outweighs the interest of the Tribe in regulating non-Indian business activities 
that occur within the state, and outside of Ute Tribal land. Allowing tribal officials to 
regulate businesses outside of Ute Tribal land results in enterprises operating exclusively 
intrastate being subjected to regulatory control by a foreign power, and infringes upon the 
jurisdiction of the state.   
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 3. The allegations set forth in the 32-page Amended Complaint provide 
sufficient notice to meet the elements of the tortious interference claim, including that 
Newfield assisted tribal officials in unlawfully boycotting and blacklisting Plaintiffs, and 
threatening to similarly blacklist third parties who chose to do business with Plaintiffs. 
The alleged purposes of this activity were to eliminate competitors of the official’s own 
businesses or those of their benefactors and to retaliate against Plaintiffs for their refusal 
to be extorted. The unlawful threats would have been meaningless but for Newfield’s 
assistance in enforcing them against Plaintiffs. 
 4. Utah’s recognition of a cause of action for extortion is a matter of first 
impression. Currently, several causes of action exist for claims akin to extortion, 
including an individual’s right to sue for losses caused by theft, and the Court should 
recognize a private cause of action for extortion. 
 5. The Amended Complaint is clear that the arrangement between tribal 
officials and Newfield was an unlawful restraint of trade, was not limited to Ute Tribal 
land, and included conduct against Plaintiffs as well as third parties. Plaintiffs allege per 
se violations of Utah antitrust laws, including unlawful boycotting and bid rigging, and 
the Amended Complaint is not only sufficient but detailed.   
 6. In rejecting the blacklisting claim, the trial court reasoned that Newfield 
followed the direction of UTERO by not using Plaintiffs for work completed on Tribal 
land. This finding misapprehends the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, which are that Plaintiffs’ 
business operations are conducted exclusively outside of Tribal land. Moreover, Newfield 
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cooperated with UTERO officials in blacklisting Plaintiffs and third parties who were 
doing business with Plaintiffs.   
 7. The Amended Complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish the elements 
of civil conspiracy. As enumerated therein, UTERO officials asked Newfield to 
discontinue using Plaintiffs’ Products or third-parties who utilized Plaintiffs’ Products, 
and Newfield assisted tribal officials in committing their tortious and illegal activities.  
 8. Defendants D.Ray Enterprises and Larose Construction participated in the 
conspiracy in order to eliminate Plaintiffs as a competitor and to retaliate for Plaintiffs’ 
refusal to be extorted. The state court has jurisdiction over these Defendants for their 
ultra vires acts in violation of state law, which occurred within the State of Utah and 
outside of Ute Tribal land.   
 9. Abundant precedent provides that tribal officials are liable in state court for 
damages for ultra vires acts even though a tribe may have sovereign immunity. The tribal 
officials’ wrongful conduct outside of Ute Tribal land is beyond the jurisdiction and valid 
authority of the Ute Tribe, and, thus, the tribal officials have no immunity from suit.  
 10.  While it is an issue of first impression in Utah, persuasive authority 
provides that when a tribe seeks affirmative relief from a state or federal court, the tribe 
waives sovereign immunity. In addition to invoking sovereign immunity on behalf of the 
Tribe, the Tribe sought dismissal of the entire case, contending the Tribe is a necessary 
and indispensable party, invited the trial court to interpret provisions of the UTERO 
Ordinance in consideration of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and filed for a stay. 
The state court must necessarily have jurisdiction to grant the affirmative relief the Tribe 
requested, and the Tribe waived sovereign immunity.  
11. Permitting Plaintiffs to file the supplemental pleading in this matter would
not have caused undue delay or prejudice, and should have been granted by the trial court. 
This is especially true where the wrongs complained of are continuing and occurred 
during the lengthy period the action was stayed by the trial court, at Defendants’ behest. 
VIII. ARGUMENT
A. The trial court erred in concluding that the Tribe is a necessary and 
indispensable party, as to causes of action which are state law claims brought 
against Tribal officials for ultra vires acts as well as other parties who are not 
affiliated with the Tribe, which occurred outside of Ute Tribal land and within the 
State of Utah, leaving Plaintiffs with no recourse. 
Utah R. of Civ. P. 19(a) requires the joinder of necessary parties. “To determine 
whether a party is necessary, a court should consider the two general factors in rule 19(a). 
First, a party is necessary if 'in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among 
those already parties.' Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) (1). Second, a party is necessary if he claims 
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the 
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest.” Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990). “The burden of 
presenting specific facts and reasoning that lead to the conclusion that a party is a 
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necessary or indispensable party is on the party attempting to persuade the court that 
parties are necessary.” Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, ¶ 
38, 208 P.3d 1077 (cited authority omitted).  
In granting the Tribe’s motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the Tribe is a 
necessary and indispensable party under Utah R. of Civ. P. 19, opining, “The inquiry is 
whether the Tribe claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in its absence may as a practical matter impair or impede 
its ability to protect that interest.” R. 1767. The trial court found that the ability to issue 
the “directives” at issue is a “critical interest of the Tribe”. R. 1768.   
The said directives are mandates that oil and gas production companies, including 
Newfield, refuse to do business with Plaintiffs, R. 558, even though Plaintiffs operate 
outside of Ute Tribal land and their Products are used outside of Ute Tribal land, R. 553-
55, and, further, that Newfield refuse to do business with any third party doing business 
with Plaintiffs. R. 559. As reiterated throughout the Amended Complaint, not only do the 
business activities at issue take place outside of Ute Tribal land, generally, R. 548-579, 
but the purpose for the directives was to punish Plaintiffs for refusing to pay Tribal 
officials’ extortionist demands. R. 558, 569. Additionally, the directives are not limited to 
a prohibition against use of Plaintiffs’ Products on tribal ground. R. 553.  
The trial court’s analysis that the regulated conduct occurred on Ute Tribal land 
conflicts with the facts set forth throughout the Amended Complaint. Generally, R. 548-
579. The directives are a blanket blacklist/boycott of Plaintiffs regardless of the location
where the Products may be used. It is not a “critical interest” of the Tribe to facilitate 
Tribal officials’ extortion of businesses that operate exclusively outside of Ute Tribal 
land or to regulate Products that are utilized outside of Ute Tribal land. Regulatory 
authority within the State of Utah and outside of Ute Tribal land falls under the purview 
of local, state, and, in some instances, federal regulatory bodies.      
The trial court’s holding is catastrophic to the interests of Plaintiffs and other 
business concerns providing products or services in the Uintah Basin. It shrouds tribal 
officials, acting ultra vires, and their co-conspirators with sovereign immunity, and 
allows them to continue to extort, threaten, harass, and damage, with impunity, every 
business which will not capitulate to their edicts, even though the businesses operate 
solely outside of Ute Tribal land. Further, if the Tribe were a necessary party for every 
action commenced against a tribal official, no action against a tribal official would be 
viable. This is contrary to well established precedent.    
The UTERO officials are not entitled to immunity for actions undertaken that are 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribe. For purposes of the motions before the trial court, 
the facts that the officials acted outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the Ute Tribe must 
be assumed true. R. 562.   
In Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of the State of Washington, 433 U.S. 165, 168-
171, 97 S. Ct. 2616, 2619-2620 (1977), the Court held that a suit to enjoin violations of 
state law by individual tribal members is permissible and does not implicate sovereign 
immunity. The Court further suggested that this includes suits against tribal officials 
brought in state court. Id. at 171-173. Even though the defendants in Puyallup Tribe, 
supra, were not tribal officials, the Court cited it in finding a tribal governor not immune 
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from a suit seeking relief against enforcement of a tribal ordinance.  See Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 1677 (1978).   
Consistently, in Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Nation, 498 U.S. 505, 514, 111 S. Ct. 905, 912 (1991), the Court stated, “In view of our 
conclusion with respect to sovereign immunity of the Tribe from suit by the State, 
Oklahoma complains that, in effect, decisions such as Moe and Colville give them a right 
without any remedy. There is no doubt that sovereign immunity bars the State from 
pursuing the most efficient remedy, but we are not persuaded that it lacks any adequate 
alternatives. We have never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe are not liable 
for damages in actions brought by the State.”   
An analysis on point is set forth in Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075 
(9th Cir. 2013). In Maxwell, the court reasoned that tribal sovereign immunity derives 
from the same common law principles that shape state and federal sovereign immunity. 
Id. at 1087-88. A suit brought against individual officers in their individual capacities, as 
in the instant case, does not implicate sovereign immunity. Id. 
More examples include holdings that sovereign immunity does not extend to tribal 
officials when acting outside their authority in violation of state law.  See Trump Hotels 
& Casino Resorts Dev. Co., LLC v. Rocow, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1215 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. May 2, 2005). In N. States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux 
Indian Cmty., 991 F.2d 458, 462, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 7698, ¶¶ 11-14 (8th Cir. 1993), 
the court held that sovereign immunity does not protect tribal officers acting beyond the 
scope of the authority the tribe was capable of bestowing on them. In the instant case, 
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Plaintiffs have alleged that the tribal officials are acting beyond the scope of the authority 
the Tribe is capable of bestowing, and in violation of state law. R. 562.  
The trial court reasoned a “. . . determination by the Court that the UTERO 
officials’ act of sending the directive to Newfield was wrongful is potentially prejudicial 
to the Tribe.” R. 1768-1769. The trial court continued that this could be prejudicial to the 
Tribe’s ability to regulate its affairs, the Tribe could ban any person or company from 
doing business on Tribal ground for any reason, and the directives at issue could create a 
significant prejudice against a key interest in tribal self-governance. R. 1769. It is 
expressly clear from the allegations in the Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs do not do 
business on tribal ground and the directives at issue were not limited to a prohibition of 
utilizing the Plaintiffs’ Products on tribal ground but were a blanket 
blacklisting/boycotting of Plaintiffs. Generally, 548-579. 
Further, the trial court could not conceive of any relief that would not prejudice 
the Tribe. R. 1769. Clearly, limiting relief to restraining conduct that is ultra vires, occurs 
outside of Ute Tribal land, and in violation of state law as set forth in the Amended 
Complaint would prejudice no legitimate interest of the Tribe. 
In summary, the Tribe is not a necessary party as to lawsuits brought to enjoin 
ultra vires acts of tribal officials that violate state law and occur on state land outside of 
Ute Tribal land. Therefore, the Tribe is not a necessary party pursuant to Utah R. of Civ. 
P. 19(a).
If a party is not a necessary party, the inquiry stops and Utah R. of Civ. P. 19(b) 
need not be analyzed.   However, the trial court also erroneously found that the Tribe is 
an indispensable party under Utah R. of Civ. P. 19(b). “If the court finds that the party is 
necessary according to these criteria, rule 19 provides that the party 'shall be joined.' 
Thus, under the language of the rule, if the party is necessary and joinder is feasible, then 
joinder is mandatory. Nevertheless, failure to join generally is not considered to be a 
jurisdictional defect.” Landes, 795 P.2d at 1131.     
The indispensability of a party is determined by examining, “(1) to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the [party’s] absence will prejudice [the party] or those already 
parties; (2) the likelihood of reducing or avoiding prejudice by protective measures or 
provisions in the judgment; (3) the adequacy of the judgment which might be entered in 
the [party’s] absence; and (4) the adequacy of the plaintiff’s remedy if the action is 
dismissed for nonjoinder.” Mower v. Simpson, 2012 UT App 149, ¶28, 278 P.3d 1076. 
The reasons the Tribe would not suffer prejudice should a judgment be rendered 
have been addressed, supra, and will not be reiterated here. However, the trial court also 
reasoned that Newfield may be subject to, “inconsistent obligations” in State Court and 
before the Tribe. R. 1771. The trial court reasoned, “Because of the potential for 
inconsistent judgments between the state courts and the UTERO commission, Newfield is 
placed in the untenable position of operating in potential violation of inconsistent 
directives from courts of two jurisdictions.” R. 1772. Newfield may have to choose 
between complying with and aiding tribal officials in unlawful and ultra vires directives 
that violate state law causing damages to state residents, or comply with state law and 
risk sanctions before the Tribe. However, as set forth in the Amended Complaint, the 
business activities at issue occur outside of Ute Tribal land and within the State of Utah. 
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Further, the directives at issue resulted in an unlawful boycott of Plaintiffs’ Products 
outside of Ute Tribal land and within the State of Utah.     
Even though the situs of the acts and occurrences is outside of Ute Tribal land, the 
effect of the trial court’s reasoning is that Newfield is absolutely immune from state law 
violations that occur within the state so long as Newfield is complying with a directive 
from a tribal official, even an unlawful and ultra vires directive. The state courts have a 
duty and obligation to protect state citizenry from violations of state law that occur within 
the state. The small business interests of state citizens whose business activities are 
outside of Ute Tribal land should not be subjugated to foreign powers simply because the 
foreign power may penalize a party for not following an ultra vires directive that 
damages a state resident on land located within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land. 
There is no justifiable reason that a state court should defer to the Tribe as it relates 
business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land.        
As it relates to the adequacy of the judgment the trial court reasoned that, “. . . 
without injunctions against the Tribe and its UTERO officials. . .” Plaintiffs would have 
an inadequate remedy. R. 1769. The injunctions that Plaintiffs requested include that the 
tribal officials be restrained from interfering with or attempting to regulate Plaintiffs’ 
business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 577. The 
tribal officials are subject to such injunctive relief.  It is true that restraining the tribal 
officials also restrains the Tribe. However, when the injunction is limited to stopping 
state law violations that occur outside of Ute Tribal land, the Tribe has no legitimate 
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interest or complaint.  Likewise, a monetary damage award entered against Newfield for 
state law violations is an adequate remedy for Plaintiffs.    
As it relates to the adequacy of Plaintiffs’ remedy if the action is dismissed for 
non-joinder, the trial court opined that Plaintiffs could have sought relief through Tribal 
Court or tribal administrative procedures. R. 1769-1770. The argument that 
administrative remedies must be exhausted is fundamentally flawed and the trial court 
fails to explain why Plaintiffs should subject themselves to a tribal forum when the 
business activities, acts, and occurrences complained of occurred exclusively within the 
state and outside of Ute Tribal land. In essence, the trial court determined it was 
appropriate that Plaintiffs subject themselves to tribal regulatory control to address 
business activities the situs of which is exclusively intrastate.     
In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493, 
1981 U.S. LEXIS 9, 49 U.S.L.W. 4296 (1981), a decision authored by Justice Potter 
Stewart, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the treaties between the United States and the 
Crow Tribe establishing the Tribe’s Montana reservation did not give the Crow Tribe 
authority to regulate non-Indian fishing on the Big Horn River, which flows through the 
heart of the Crow Tribe’s reservation. The Court conceded the retention of certain 
inherent tribal powers, but denied that these went beyond “what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations.” Id. at 564-65.   
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
U.S. 408, 425, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 3005, 106 L. Ed. 2d 343, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3288, 57 
U.S.L.W. 4999 (1989), the Court, applying Montana, held that, except for isolated “land-
locked” tracts surrounded by tribal lands, tribes could not zone reservation fee land 
owned by nonmembers. A tribe’s general interest in regulating reservation land use could 
not, according to the Court, support its jurisdiction under the second Montana exception.  
Id. at 428.  In the instant case, tribal officials are attempting to regulate business activity 
occurring on fee land located outside of Ute Tribal land. This is well beyond a Montana 
exception.   
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997), the Montana 
rule assumed its modern form. The issue in Strate was tribal court jurisdiction over 
claims brought by tribal members against a nonmember arising from a motor vehicle 
accident on the Fort Berthold reservation. Id. at 442. First, the Court extended the 
Montana rule previously applied to tribal regulatory authority to a tribe’s adjudicatory 
authority, holding that the scope of a tribe’s adjudicatory authority could not exceed the 
scope of its regulatory authority. Id. at 453. Second, the Court effectively held that the 
exceptions to the general Montana rule really were not exceptions at all. Id. at 459.  
Conceding that “[r]ead in isolation, the Montana rule’s second exception can be 
misperceived,” the Court declared as the “key” to its proper application is the underlying 
principle that a tribe’s authority does not extend beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations. Id. 
Attempting to regulate business activity that occurs outside of Ute Tribal land has 
nothing to do with protecting tribal self-government or the ability to control internal 
relations.  U.S. Supreme Court decisions make clear there is a presumption against tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers and, in the absence of congressional delegation, the burden 
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is on the Tribe to show that one of the Montana exceptions applies. The business 
activities at issue take place outside of Ute Tribal land. There is no Montana exception 
that would subject Plaintiffs to the Tribe’s jurisdiction and any administrative remedies 
under tribal law. Plaintiffs should not have to subject themselves to a foreign jurisdiction 
to protect business operations that are exclusively intrastate, outside of Ute Tribal land, 
and well beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribe. 
B. The trial court erred in not concluding that the state’s interests in promoting 
fair and competitive business activity free from unlawful interference from foreign 
powers by protecting non-Indian state residents, who compose roughly 95% of the 
area population, state small businesses, and the oil and gas industry, which is the 
lifeblood of the local economy, outweigh the interests of the Tribe in regulating non-
Indian business activities that occur within the state and outside of Ute Tribal land.   
The recent trend of decisions from the Supreme Court requires that suits involving 
a non-Indian on privately owned land must be brought in state court. See generally Robert 
D. Probasco, Indian Tribe, Civil Rights, and Federal Courts, 7 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 
119 (2001) (explaining the jurisdictional rules applicable to Indians and non-Indians that 
depend upon land ownership).   
In Montana, supra, the Supreme Court held that tribes lack regulatory jurisdiction 
except where, “necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations”. 450 U.S. at 561. The narrow exceptions, inapplicable to the case at bar, are as 
to those entering consensual relationships with the tribe or if the conduct threatens or has
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some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or 
welfare of the tribe. In the instant case the Tribe lacks jurisdiction. The parties include 
Indians and non-Indians, the conduct occurred outside of Ute Tribal land, and no 
exception is applicable that would provide the Tribe with jurisdiction.     
However, a state may regulate activities on Indian reservations when it has a 
sufficient interest. For example, states have jurisdiction to tax the output of mines and oil 
wells of any lessee of Indian lands. See 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1927). In Hagen, supra, the 
Supreme Court found the reservation was diminished and considered the following 
factors: (1) The area is predominately populated by non-Indians; (2) A finding that the 
land remains Indian Country seriously burdens the administration of state and local 
governments; (3) The State of Utah has exercised jurisdiction over the lands open to non-
Indian settlement from the time the reservation was opened; and (4) That a contrary 
conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the 
area. 510 U.S. at 420-21. 
Assuming for argument purposes this were a case of concurrent jurisdiction, the 
Court would balance the interests of protecting the vast majority of the area’s population 
and the lifeblood of the local economy from the conduct set forth in the Alleged 
Complaint. Not only does the Tribe lack jurisdiction based upon the situs of the conduct 
in question, balancing the interests involved strongly favors state jurisdiction.  Uintah 
Basin residents who have spent a lifetime, and in some cases generations, developing 
small business interests should not be under the constant threat of having business 
operations shut down overnight because they refuse to be extorted by a tribal official 
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acting ultra vires and in violation of state law. Especially, where the situs is outside of 
Ute Tribal land.  
C. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
1. Overview and Legal Standard
The alternative bases for the trial court’s dismissal will be addressed in this 
section.  There is considerable overlap between Defendants’ respective motions and 
common legal standards of review.  The general standard of review applicable is set forth 
below.  Any issue with a different standard will be expressly addressed in the subsection 
as applicable.   
Fed. R. of Civ. P. 8(a)2 (2010) requires a pleading to contain a “short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoted authority and citations omitted), 
the Court instructed that Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” and then 
stated: 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”  A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the   misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is 
not akin to a “probability requirement” but it asks for more than 
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 
The Court then pointed out that “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 
a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether those facts plausibly 
give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. 
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A Utah R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(6) defense is a challenge to Plaintiffs’ right to relief 
based on facts Plaintiffs have alleged.  See Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264, 
1995 Utah LEXIS 43, 2 (Utah 1995). A court reviews a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
determine whether Plaintiffs would be entitled to relief under any state of facts which 
could be proved in support of its claims. See Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 
107, 109, 1990 Utah App. LEXIS 66, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The court must accept the 
factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  See Alvarez 
v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 989, 1997 Utah LEXIS 22, 5 (Utah 1997).
2. Tortious Interference with Economic Relations
The elements of a claim for tortious interference with economic relations include, 
“(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s existing or potential or 
existing economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) 
causing injury to plaintiff.”  Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 
1982 Utah LEXIS 1130, 30 (Utah 1982).   
The trial court found that the factual allegations against Newfield failed to provide 
Newfield “. . . fair notice of the actions complained of.” R. 1779. In addition to the 
Amended Complaint, the trial court also considered a March 20, 2013 letter from tribal 
officials. R. 1778. The relevant portions of the March 20, 2013, letter considered by the 
trial court include, “Any use of these businesses and individuals [Plaintiffs] by an 
employer doing work on the Reservation after receipt of this Notice may result in the 
assessment of penalties and/or sanctions against such employer to the fullest extent of the 
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law.” R. 000053.  Notably, this directive is not limited to use of the Plaintiffs on Ute 
Tribal land but is rather a blanket boycott/blacklist of Plaintiffs regardless of the situs of 
the business activity.   
 As it relates to fair notice of the actions complained of the allegations of the 
Amended Complaint are that: (1) Newfield agreed to cooperate with the tribal officials 
ultra vires directive and boycott Plaintiffs; (2) Newfield refused to work with any third 
party that does business with Plaintiffs; (3) Newfield intentionally interfered with 
Plaintiffs existing and potential relations; (4) Newfield acted with an improper purpose 
and/or through improper means in aid of the tribal officials; (5) Newfield did so to 
promote its own business interests; and (6) these actions are the direct and proximate 
cause of injury to Plaintiffs. R 558-559, 567-568. Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the 
facts set forth in the Amended Complaint allege that Newfield not only agreed to join in 
the boycott and blacklisting of Plaintiffs, but that Newfield threatened to boycott any 
third party who conducted business with Plaintiffs. Id.      
 Moreover, Utah courts have ruled that in commercial settings a court should look 
to improper means and have said that “improper means is shown when the plaintiff 
proves that the defendant’s means of interference were contrary to statutory, regulatory, 
or common law . . . .”  U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App. 303, ¶49, 990 
P.2d 945 (quoted authority omitted).  Improper means can include violence, threats and 
violating established standards of the trade or profession.  St. Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 201,1991 Utah LEXIS 36, 22 (Utah 1991) ((quoting Top 
Page 33 of 54 
Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201, 210 n.11, 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 
n.11 (1978)).
The Amended Complaint sets forth substantial and detailed facts concerning 
improper means in relationship to Newfield. The UTERO officials desired to regulate 
businesses outside of Ute Tribal land, and the UTERO Commissioners sought payment of 
bribes and to extort area small businesses. Generally, 548-579. The UTERO 
Commissioners, in an attempt to force Plaintiffs to pay them bribes and to comply with 
the UTERO ordinance outside of Ute Tribal land, threatened Plaintiffs that they would 
put them out of business.  Id.  To accomplish that illegal activity, the UTERO 
Commissioners blacklisted and boycotted Plaintiffs.  Id.  Newfield assisted the UTERO 
Commissioners in that illegal activity, participating in the boycott, and refusing to use 
Plaintiffs’ Products and also refusing to use the services of anyone who did business with 
Plaintiffs, as requested by the UTERO Commissioners.  Id.  The boycott and blacklisting, 
as well as the extortionist demands, are unlawful.  Id.  But for Newfield’s cooperation 
and aid the unlawful threats of tribal officials would be empty.  Id.  These activities 
constitute improper means on the part of Newfield. The elements of the tort of unlawful 
interference with prospective economic advantage have been properly pled. 
3. Extortion
Newfield argued and the trial court agreed that Utah does not recognize a cause of 
action for extortion. R. 1779-1780. This is an issue of first impression and the trial court 
failed to support its position with any meaningful analysis. The cases cited by Newfield 
in support of its position before the trial court, however, are not dispositive on that 
assertion. Jensen v. America 's Wholesale Lender, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67777, 2010 
WL 2720745 (D. Utah 2010), involved pro se litigants, and the court’s holding consists 
of a conclusory ruling, devoid of any legal analysis. The report and recommendation in 
Whipple v. Utah, No. 2: I O-cv-81 1 DAK, 201 1 WL 4368568 (D. Utah Aug.  25, 2011) 
(unreported) does not analyze the issue, but simply asserts that there is no civil cause of 
action in Utah for theft.  
Utah has, however, allowed for civil relief in such circumstances. See e.g. Hill v. 
Estate of Allred, 2009 UT 28, 216 P.3d 929; Alta Indus. LTD v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 
1290 (Utah 1993); Bonnie & Hyde Inc. v. Lynch, 2013 UT App. 153, 305 P.3d 196.  
Extortion is a theft crime in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-406 (1973).  In Utah, 
individuals have a right to seek recovery when they have been subjected to a theft in its 
many varieties. See e.g. Hill, 2009 UT 28; Alta Indus., 846 P.2d at 1290.   
Extortion has also been recognized as a tort cause of action in some states.  In 
California, it is sometimes referred to as duress or economic duress. See Crosstalk 
Productions Inc. v. Jacobsen, 65 Cal. App. 4th 631, 645 (1998) (quoted authority 
omitted), stating that the elements are threats to business or property “sufficiently 
coercive to cause a reasonably prudent person to be faced with no reasonable alternative 
but to ‘succumb”’ to the threat. Utah has adopted a cause of action in contract law that 
allows the voiding of a contract for economic duress. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc v. Johnson, 
596 P.2d 658, 660 (Utah 1979).  Counsel was unable to locate any decision directly 
addressing whether Utah recognizes extortion or duress as a tort.  However, Utah has 
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recognized an individual’s right to sue personally for losses caused by theft and there is 
no reason that right should not include extortion. 
In the instant case the demands for extortion and threats put Plaintiffs under 
extreme duress. These threats were particularly alarming to Plaintiffs who were aware of 
similarly situated businesses that were shut down by tribal officials if the businesses 
refused to be extorted. These threats cut directly to the viability of area businesses and the 
ability of area residents to earn a livelihood.   
4. Utah Antitrust Act
The trial court found that “[t]he Plaintiffs offer no facts alleging that Newfield and 
the other Defendants had a meeting of the minds to boycott Plaintiffs’ business. All that 
is alleged is UTERO informed Newfield that the Rocks Off was no longer allowed to 
conduct business on tribal land, and Newfield relayed the message to the Plaintiffs 
explaining that Newfield was not going to do business with Plaintiffs due to the UTERO 
notice.  The Plaintiffs’ claim merely recites the elements of an antitrust claim.” R. 1780.  
The facts in the Amended Complaint directly conflict with the trial court’s finding. 
The Amended Complaint is expressly clear that Plaintiffs do not conduct business on 
tribal land and Plaintiffs do not even have to pass through tribal land in conducting 
Plaintiffs’ business activities. R. 554-555. The tribal officials demand was not limited to 
Ute Tribal land but a general boycott of Plaintiffs’ businesses. Further, Newfield 
facilitated the boycott by demanding all third parties it does business with to boycott 
Plaintiffs in furtherance of the “. . . unlawful UTERO blacklist and boycott of Plaintiffs.” 
R. 559.
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 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-3101 (2013) provides that “[t]he purpose of [the Utah 
Antitrust Act] is . . . to encourage free and open competition . . . by prohibiting . . . unfair 
trade practices, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. . . .”  The statute is to 
be interpreted in light of the strong public policy disfavoring anti-competitive practices.” 
Summit Water Distrib. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, ¶29, 123 P.2d 437 (citing City of 
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978)), and the provisions of the 
statute are to be broadly construed.  Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 185, 1998 Utah LEXIS 
37, 25-26 (Utah 1998). 
 Plaintiffs’ Fifth Cause of Action alleges that Defendants, including Newfield, 
entered into contracts, agreements or conspiracies to place unlawful restraints on trade or 
commerce, and that they were involved in an unlawful boycott of Plaintiffs. R. 569-572. 
Newfield argued before the trial court that there is no contract, combination or 
conspiracy. “‘[N]o formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy,’ 
and . . . ‘business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact 
finder may infer agreement.’” Brixen & Christopher Architects v. State, 2001 UT App 
210, ¶35, 29 P.3d 650 (quoted authority omitted). The conspiracy may be vertical or 
horizontal.  Id. at ¶¶ 36-39. 
 The factual allegations are that the UTERO Commissioners sent a letter to 
Newfield asking it to boycott Plaintiffs and not purchase Products from Plaintiffs or from 
anyone who obtained Products from Plaintiffs. R. 558-559. The UTERO Commissioners 
further asked Newfield to purchase those Products from entities in which the UTERO 
Commissioners owned an interest, such as Larose Construction, or from whom they were 
receiving bribes or kickbacks, such as Huffman. R. 569-572. 
The UTERO Commissioners intended to put Plaintiffs out of business through the 
unlawful boycott. R. 571. Newfield expressly agreed to that request in written 
communications sent to Plaintiffs and ceased purchasing Products from Plaintiffs. R. 
558-559. In addition, Newfield demanded that third party businesses participate on the 
boycott.  R. 558-559. Such action manifests an agreement, contract, combination or 
conspiracy. 
Newfield’s argument before the trial court, and the trial court’s finding that the 
Amended Complaint does not allege any facts of the agreement, ignores the factual 
allegations in paragraphs 18 thru 96 of the Amended Complaint, including allegations 
that the UTERO Commissioners intended to shut down Plaintiffs’ business, that, on 
March 20, 2013, Newfield was told not to utilize Plaintiffs’ Products, that, on March 22, 
2013, Newfield agreed with that unlawful boycott request and informed Plaintiffs it 
would no longer utilize Plaintiffs’ Products and that it would also not use any business 
that utilized Plaintiffs’ Products. R. 552-562. Newfield agreed to and did cooperate with 
the tribal officials in this boycott to put Plaintiffs out of business and to enhance the 
businesses in which the tribal officials had an interest or from whom they were receiving 
bribes. R. 552-562, 568-571. Plaintiffs also alleged bid rigging. Specifically, “. . . that 
UTERO officials dictate to oil and gas companies which contractors will be awarded bids 
and which contractors are not to be used.” R. 561. This bid rigging is not limited to Ute 
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Tribal land and as set forth in the amended complaint the conduct complained of occurs 
outside of Ute Tribal land. R. 562.    
The present case is not unlike State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805 (Ut. Ct. App.  
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), where a security officer 
accepted monies to exclude other security guard service providers from successfully 
bidding on the Utah Power and Light contract. Here Newfield, while not taking a bribe, 
but wanting to ensure work from the Tribe, agreed to prevent Plaintiffs and others from 
receiving orders from Newfield for Products, so that those orders went to entities in 
which the UTERO Commissioners had an interest or which were bribing the UTERO 
Commissioners.  
Plaintiffs must also show that the “alleged concerted action imposes an 
unreasonable restraint on trade.” The Fifth Cause of Action is based on the Utah Antitrust 
Act. Under Utah law, “[s]ome activities in restraint of trade ‘have such a predictable and 
pernicious anti-competitive effect, and such limited potential for pro-competitive benefit,  
that they are deemed unlawful per se.’” Brixen, 2001 UT App 210 ¶41, (quoted authority 
omitted); See also Utah Code Ann. §76-10-3112 (2013) (identifying “price fixing, bid 
rigging,  agreeing  among competitors to divide customers or territories, or . . . engaging 
in a group boycott with specific intent of eliminating competition”  as per se violations). 
Notably, in Thompson, supra, the court observed that per se violations of a group 
boycott under Utah statute could be interpreted more broadly than under federal law, 751 
P.2d at 813, stating that “[a]lthough the coercive pressure was applied vertically, the
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stifling of competition was horizontal. A conspiracy to form a group boycott was 
therefore established.” Id. at 814 (cited authority omitted). 
The actions of Newfield and the UTERO Commissioners amount to an illegal 
boycott, bid rigging and/or restraint of trade, clearly harming the local oil and gas 
industry by increasing production costs (valid market) in the Uintah Basin and the public 
that pays for that activity as it damages the local economic activity by hurting all 
businesses operating in the local oil and gas industry, which is the lifeblood of the local 
economy. The Amended Complaint alleges that Newfield and the UTERO officials 
conspired to eliminate Plaintiffs as competitors, diverted work from Plaintiffs in 
exchange for bribes from Plaintiffs’ competitors, diverted work to competitors in which 
tribal officials had an interest and illegally boycotted Plaintiffs. R. 568-571. These 
allegations not only plead sufficient circumstances under the rule of reason analysis, but 
Plaintiffs have pled per se violations of state law including unlawful boycotting and bid 
rigging. R. 552-562, 568-571. 
5. Blacklisting
In an analysis consisting of a single paragraph, the trial court found that, “The 
facts allege that Newfield followed the direction of UTERO by not using Plaintiff for 
work completed on tribal land because the Plaintiff was no longer licensed to do work on 
tribal land.” R. 1781. This finding directly conflicts with the facts set forth in the 
Amended Complaint. R. 548-579. This demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the trial court in that work done on tribal land and Plaintiffs working on tribal land was 
never alleged in the Amended Complaint and is not at issue. See R. 562. Plaintiffs’ 
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Amended Complaint alleges the contrary. R. 562. Specifically, that Plaintiffs’ business 
operations are conducted outside of tribal land and Plaintiffs do not work on tribal land. 
R. 553-555.   
 Before the trial court, Newfield asserted that Utah does not recognize a cause of 
action for blacklisting, relying on Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the version of Section 19, Article 
XII, of the Utah Constitution, in effect at that time, did not create a private cause of 
action, because Section 19 instructed that the legislature would provide for enforcement 
and that the legislature had provided criminal sanctions in Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-24-1 
and 34-24-2. However, the court, in rendering its decision, noted that its decision was 
premised upon the constitutional provision “in force at the time,” and that “the last 
sentence [of Section 19) was stricken by constitutional amendment effective on January 
1, 1993.” Id.  at 10, n.2.  Indeed, the amendment removed the language that the 
legislature would provide a remedy for a constitutional violation. Moreover, in 2013, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-24-1 and 34-24-2, were themselves repealed. 
 The floor debate on the issue of the repeal of §§ 34-24-1 and 34-24-1 is 
elucidating on the issue of a civil cause of action for blacklisting. Senator Daniel 
Thatcher, the bill’s sponsor, contended there was no need for the criminal statute as he 
could not find a case of its being prosecuted, and that blacklisting was already covered by 
civil law, stating, among other things, that “where causing financial harm to another 
person is covered under civil law which really is a more appropriate place for this to be 
handled” and “the current practice is to handle all of this under civil law.” Recording of 
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Utah Senate Floor Debates, S.B. 142, 60th Leg., Gen.  Sess. (Feb. 4, 2013). Senator John 
Valentine, speaking in favor of the bill, agreed that no criminal repercussions for 
blacklisting were needed, averring, “I have seen lots of cases brought in the civil [court] . 
. ., where this cause of action is widely recognized, [and] is widely proceeded upon by 
attorneys,” and “there’s an adequate remedy in . . . civil matters to sue for damages and 
for injunctive relief.” Id. Senator Thatcher then, in summation, emphasized, “The act of 
stopping someone who has done no wrong from getting another job is a deplorable act, it 
is a shameful act, and it is an act where the person wronged should have the opportunity 
to sue for redress of grief, which is the current practice. I am not proposing that 
blacklisting . . . is appropriate.” Id. In short, both senators strenuously argued the criminal 
provisions of the repealed sections were unnecessary as the baneful act of blacklisting 
could be addressed in civil court, as Plaintiffs seek to do in this matter.   
Of note, in 2012, many years after the decision cited by Newfield and even before 
the repeal of the aforesaid statutory provisions, in Brock v. Herbert, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42041, ¶ 7, 2012 WL 1029355 (D. Utah 2012), the court recognized the 
possibility of blacklisting claims, stating “Utah courts have given little guidance on the 
scope and applicability of these provisions, referring to Utah Const. Art. XII §19 and 
XVI §4, in cases like the one currently before the court. Novel questions of state law 
should be decided by state courts.” 
Newfield also argued before the trial court that there was no allegation of an 
exchange of blacklists, but this ignores the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint. The 
UTERO Commissioners blacklisted Plaintiffs and told Newfield not to use them or their 
Page 42 of 54 
services or the services of those utilizing Plaintiffs’ services, even though Plaintiffs’ 
operate outside of Ute Tribal land. Newfield agreed to cooperate with the UTERO 
officials, and, in fact, did take that illegal action. Newfield also refused to do business 
with parties who were doing business with Plaintiffs. This clearly interfered with 
Plaintiffs’ employment, ability to earn a livelihood, and such is a violation of Articles 
Utah Const. Art. XII §19 and XVI §4
6. Civil Conspiracy
The trial court, in an analysis consisting of a brief paragraph, found as relevant to 
this appeal, “The Plaintiffs’ Amended Verified Complaint does not allege any facts 
concerning an underlying tort. Nor have the Plaintiffs alleged any facts showing 
Newfield and the other Defendants came to a meeting of the minds to commit an 
unlawful act against Plaintiffs.” R. 1782. For the reasons set forth supra, the trial court’s 
finding directly conflicts with or ignores the allegations set forth in the Amended 
Complaint.   
The trial court’s finding ignores the provisions of the Amended Complaint that 
contain the allegations with respect to the torts of interference with prospective economic 
advantage, extortion, blacklisting and antitrust. These allegations, as stated in the 
Amended Complaint, are incorporated into each successive claim. 
The Amended Complaint alleges that the UTERO Commissioners communicated 
with Newfield and asked for its support in the commission of these torts by refusing to 
continue to use Plaintiffs’ Products. Newfield agreed with the UTERO Commissioners 
(meeting of the minds) to assist the UTERO Commission in committing these torts and 
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illegal activity. Newfield then complied with the request and stopped using Plaintiffs’ 
Products, and Newfield also refused to use third-party service providers that utilized 
Plaintiffs' Products.   
Civil conspiracy requires (1) combination of two or more persons (in this case 
Newfield and the UTERO Commissioners), (2) object to be accomplished (put Plaintiffs 
out of business and enhance selected competitors), (3) a meeting of the minds on the 
course of action (UTERO Commissioners asked Newfield to participate in the illegal 
boycott and not buy services and products from Plaintiffs or those purchasing Products 
from Plaintiffs and Newfield agreed), (4) one or more unlawful acts (illegal boycott and 
restraint of trade, extortion, blacklisting) and (5) damages. See Alta Industries LTD v. 
Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, n. 17, 1993 Utah LEXIS 37, 205 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 1993) 
(listing the elements of civil conspiracy).  
7. Claims against D.Ray Enterprises and LaRose Construction
The trial court’s factual analysis of the 12(b)(6) motion made by D.Ray 
Enterprises and Larose Construction consists of two sentences.  These two sentences 
read, “The Amended Verified Complaint only alleges facts regarding the individual 
Defendants’ actions as individuals and as government officials of the Tribe.  
Consequently, the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
against these two corporate Defendants.” R. 1785. 
The allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint relevant to these corporate 
defendants are as follows. That LaRose, as on owner of Larose Construction, receives 
bribes and work from Huffman, a competitor of Plaintiffs, in exchange for LaRose 
abusing his position as a tribal officer and wrongfully diverting business from Plaintiffs 
to Huffman. R. 561. Further, that LaRose, L.C. Welding, and Scamp conspired to receive 
an economic interest in a competing gravel pit located on “. . . private fee land which 
commenced operations immediately after Plaintiffs operations were 'shut down' by 
Director Wopsock.” R. 571. Cesspooch owns an interest in an oil & gas service company 
D.Ray Enterprises. R. 562. Cesspooch, LaRose, and Director Wopsock conspired to 
abuse their UTERO positions to eliminate Plaintiffs as a competitor. R. 571. In addition, 
these tribal officials conspired to abuse their positions to destroy Plaintiffs’ businesses for 
refusing to be extorted by Cesspooch. R. 571. That LaRose Construction and D.Ray 
Enterprises “. . . participate in the conspiracy and derived a substantial economic benefit 
from the Conspiring Defendants’ unlawful restraint of trade and commerce.” R. 571.   
Plaintiffs also alleged that the trial court, “. . . has jurisdiction over the tribal 
officials based on the tribal officials’ violation of state law, the acts complained of by the 
tribal officials are ultra vires, and the unlawful and unauthorized conduct has caused and 
continues to cause substantial and irreparable harm to non-Indian Plaintiffs business 
activities on private fee land that is not Indian Country or reservation. . .” R. 562.  
It is difficult to understand why the trial court failed to consider these factual 
allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint in dismissing the action as it relates to 
LaRose Construction and D.Ray Enterprises. Plaintiffs expressly and clearly alleged that 
these companies engaged in the conspiracy for the express purpose of eliminating 
Plaintiffs as a competitor and because Plaintiffs refused to be extorted. Further, the 
location of this wrongful conduct was outside of Ute Tribal land.   
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D. The trial court erred in concluding that the tribal officials are immune from 
suit when the conduct complained of violates state law, occurred outside of Ute 
Tribal land, within the State of Utah and outside the jurisdiction of the Tribe.   
In dismissing the action against the tribal officials the trial court found that, “The 
Plaintiffs allege that the UTERO officials acted beyond the scope of the authority given 
them to regulate business on tribal land.” R. 1787. Plaintiffs alleged nothing of the sort in 
the Amended Complaint.  In fact, Plaintiffs allege exactly the opposite. 
What Plaintiffs allege in the Amended Complaint is that, “This Court has 
jurisdiction over the tribal officials based on the tribal officials violations of state law, the 
acts complained of by the tribal officials are ultra vires, and the unlawful and 
unauthorized conduct has caused and continues to cause substantial and irreparable harm 
to non-Indian Plaintiffs’ business activities on private fee land that is not Indian Country 
or reservation as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 
S. Ct. 958 (1994).” R. 562.  This allegation and theme is repeated throughout the 
Amended Complaint. Generally, 548-579.  Therefore, the trial court’s statements that the 
situs of the acts at issue is Ute Tribal land directly diverges from the facts alleged 
throughout the Amended Complaint. Id.  Further, the tribal officials are sued in their 
individual as well as their official capacities.  Accordingly, the trial court’s analysis 
misses the mark.   
The trial court found that the Tribe was the “real party in interest” in dismissing 
this action as to the tribal officials. R. 1787.  However, precedent makes clear that tribal 
officers are liable for damages for ultra vires acts.  In Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. 
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at 514, the Court stated, “we have never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe 
are not liable for damage in actions brought by the State.” This statement was made even 
though the Court recognized that there was “. . . no doubt that sovereign immunity. . .” 
barred the “. . . most efficient remedy. . . .” which would have been a suit against the 
tribe.  Id.   
As explained by the D.C. Circuit, “There may be, of course, suits for specific 
relief against officers of the sovereign which are not suits against the sovereign. . . . 
[W]here the officer’s powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations 
are considered individual and not sovereign actions. . .”  Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 
741, 750, 383 U.S. App. D.C. 14, 23, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16561 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949)).  
As alleged in the instant case, the actions of the tribal officials are not only beyond the 
scope of the UTERO ordinance but also beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribe 
itself which infringes upon the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. R. 562.    
   The Ninth Circuit has held that tribal officials enjoy immunity only to the extent 
of the tribe’s valid authority. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of 
Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 924 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 
1212 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Big Horn County Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Adams, 
219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000). In the instant case, Tribe officials are engaged in wrongful 
conduct outside of Ute Tribal land that damages non-Indian state residents and small 
businesses. This is beyond the Tribe’s jurisdiction and “valid authority” making 
Burlington on point. The holding that tribal officials lack immunity for conduct beyond 
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the jurisdiction of the tribe has been followed by many circuits.  See Baker Electric Co-
op, Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1471-72 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Wisconsin v. Baker, 
698 F.2d 1323, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); see also 
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16, 30 (1st Cir. 2006 (en banc), 
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1053 (2006). 
In all of these cases, it could be argued that the tribe is the real party in interest.  
However, when the allegation is that tribal officials have acted beyond the scope of the 
authority the tribe is capable of bestowing, such as in the instant case, there is no 
immunity for the tribal officials.  The trial court’s dismissal on the grounds that the Tribe 
is the real party in interest runs afoul of well-reasoned precedent of the circuit courts.     
E. The Tribe Waived Sovereign Immunity
On August 2, 2013, the parties submitted briefing to the trial court on the issue of
whether the Tribe made a general appearance in this action. A determination of that issue 
was not made by the trial court at the time of the January 29, 2016 hearing on the 
motions to dismiss at issue in the instant appeal. On January 29, 2016, Plaintiffs provided 
the Court and opposing counsel with cases holding that sovereign immunity is waived if 
an Indian Tribe makes a general appearance in a state court action. This issue is an issue 
of first impression and a question of law. 
In Friends of East Willits Valley v. Cnty of Mendocino, 101 Cal. App. 4th 191, 
197, 202, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 4509, 2002 Cal. Daily Op. 
Service 7488, 2002 Daily Journal DAR 9380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2002), the court 
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cited with approval a prior unpublished opinion that concluded that because an Indian 
Tribe made a general appearance in a state court action it waived its sovereign immunity.   
 In United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1015, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 17888 
(9th Cir. 1981), the court held that a tribe, by intervening in a lawsuit, assumed the risk 
that its position would not be accepted and thereby waived sovereign immunity in the 
proceeding. The court reasoned, “Here, the Tribe intervened to establish and protect its 
treaty fishing rights; a basic assumption of that action was that there would be fish to 
protect. Had the original decree found the species to be in jeopardy, and enjoined all 
parties from future fishing in order to conserve the species, the Yakimas could not have 
then claimed immunity from such an action. Otherwise, tribal immunity might be 
transformed into a rule that tribes may never lose a lawsuit.”  Id. at 1014. 
 A California trial court cited the above decisions when it found that a Tribe 
waived sovereign immunity when it appeared before the court and sought affirmative 
relief.  See Nushake, Inc. v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, CGC-05-441299.   
 The general principle of the cases cited, supra, is that if a tribe seeks affirmative 
relief from a state court, or federal court, the tribe has waived sovereign immunity.  This 
principle is consistent with Barlow v. Cappo, 821 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App. 1991), 
holding that when a defendant seeks affirmative relief from a Court, the defendant has 
submitted himself to that court’s jurisdiction. 
 In the instant case, the Tribe has sought affirmative relief from the trial court that 
necessarily entails a concession that this Court has jurisdiction over this action. For 
example, the Tribe argued before the trial court that not only should the case be dismissed 
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because the Tribe has sovereign immunity, but the Court should dismiss the action as to 
the remaining defendants because the Tribe is a necessary and indispensable party. 
Consequently, the Tribe has gone beyond seeking dismissal based on sovereign immunity 
grounds, it has sought affirmative relief on behalf of other defendants, in addition to the 
Tribe, and moved for a dismissal of the action as to these defendants as well. 
The Tribe has also requested that this Court interpret certain provisions of the 
UTERO Ordinance and tribal law in consideration of the issues of waiver of sovereign 
immunity and dismissal on the grounds of exhaustion of administrative remedies. To 
dismiss on these grounds, the Court must have jurisdiction. By moving to dismiss on 
these grounds, the Tribe has waived immunity and conceded jurisdiction by requesting 
relief that necessitates that the trial court exercise jurisdiction.  The Tribe could have 
limited its motion to dismissing the action as to the Tribe on the grounds of sovereign 
immunity.  However, the Tribe, on multiple occasions, has sought affirmative relief from 
the state court on grounds that concede jurisdiction.  Plaintiffs seek leave to submit 
briefing on this issue. 
F. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement
Utah R. of Civ. P. 15(d) provides:
(d) Supplemental pleadings. -- Upon motion of a party the
court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as
are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting
forth transactions or occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the
original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for
relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the
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adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so 
order, specifying the time therefor. 
  “The court’s standard for exercising discretion on a motion to supplement is the 
same as that for disposing of a motion to amend under Rule 15(a)[2].”  First Savings 
Bank v. U.S. Bancorp, 184 F.R.D. 363, 368 (D. Kan. 1998) (quoted authority and 
citations omitted).  In considering motions to amend pleadings, primary considerations 
are whether parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and whether any party 
receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage.  Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
786 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoted authority and citations omitted). 
Rule 15(d) provides that “[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on 
just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, 
occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).  A Rule 15(d) motion is “addressed to the sound discretion of the 
court, and leave to serve a supplemental pleading ‘should be liberally granted unless good 
reason exists for denying leave.’”  Sw. Nurseries, LLC v. Florists Mut. Ins., Inc., 266 F. 
Supp. 2d 1253, 1256 (D. Colo. 2003) (quoting Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 240 
F.3d 1268, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001)).  “Refusing leave to amend is generally only justified
upon a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or 
dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or 
futility of amendment.”  Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993). 
Despite the passage of time, this case is in its infancy and allowing leave to supplement 
will not prejudice any party.     
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IX. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court reverse the 
trial court’s decision in its entirety and remand the case back to trial court. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2016. 
JOHN D. HANCOCK LAW GROUP, PLLC 
/s/ John D. Hancock  
John D. Hancock, Esq. (#10435) 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party 
in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the 
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the 
court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be 
made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his 
joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person as described in Subdivision
(a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good 
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent 
person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to 
what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already 
parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the 
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action 
is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if
known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof who are not joined, 
and the reasons why they are not joined. 
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: May 12, 2016 /s/ SAMUEL P CHIARA
09:49:54 AM District Court Judge
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